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We describe an encrypted communication principle that forms a secure link between two parties without
electronically saving either of their keys. Instead, random cryptographic bits are kept safe within the unique
mesoscopic randomness of two volumetric scattering materials. We demonstrate how a shared set of
patterned optical probes can generate 10 gigabits of statistically verified randomness between a pair of
unique 2 mm3 scattering objects. This shared randomness is used to facilitate information-theoretically
secure communication following a modified one-time pad protocol. Benefits of volumetric physical storage
over electronic memory include the inability to probe, duplicate or selectively reset any bits without
fundamentally altering the entire key space. Our ability to securely couple the randomness contained within
two unique physical objects can extend to strengthen hardware required by a variety of cryptographic
protocols, which is currently a critically weak link in the security pipeline of our increasingly mobile
communication culture.
O
ne-time pads are commonly acknowledged as the holy grail of cryptography1, but have limited applica-
tion in modern ciphers. In practice, an unbreakable one-time pad (OTP) protocol requires storage of a
large and random key that must remain absolutely safe against malicious attempts to copy it. As
demonstrated by numerous recent database breaches, key storage is inherently vulnerable when digital electronic
memory is used. Beyond surreptitious attacks via malicious software, digital electronic hardware is also suscept-
ible to physically invasive threats2,3. Discrete reset4, imaging5 and freezing6 attacks can easily recover partial or
entire keys. In this work, we present a new optical system and communication protocol that allows two parties to
securely share gigabits of statistically random OTP keys without electronically saving any sensitive key informa-
tion. Each key is derived by optically probing the randomness contained within a uniquely complex physical
structure and keys are shared with OTP-strong security (i.e., eavesdropping is theoretically impossible). This
novel method is extraordinarily resilient to malicious duplication attempts and is capable of securely storing
communication keys at an unprecedented density. Our scheme may additionally extend to public key-based
protocols, which, as photonic devices begin to solve an increasing number of integrated circuit bottlenecks,
indicates volumetric scattering as a natural and efficient communication key database.
Prior optical methods of establishing encrypted two-party communication include classical spatial7 and tem-
poral8–12 setups, as well as quantum key distribution13 (QKD). Each of these approaches, including the uncon-
ditionally secure connection offered by QKD, must electronically save its keys14,15. Developing a portable key
storage medium that protects against the various threats2–6 that currently frustrate conventional electronic
memory will undoubtedly improve mobile communication security16,17. Attempts at safeguarding electronic
memory have applied the inherent randomness within an integrated circuit18–20, FPGA21 or RFID chip22 to
implement what is often referred to as a physical unclonable function (PUF). Optical scattering-based PUF
devices23–26 have also been developed to help eliminate insecure electronics, but primarily aim to create keys
for terminal-based identification and authentication. All previously demonstrated PUF setups exhibit an extre-
mely limited bit capacity – reproducible keys are on the order of kilobits.
Our work using optical scattering differs from these prior investigations in three primary regards. First, we are
interested in storing keys for information-theoretically safe communication, not for identification or authentica-
tion. Second, given this new goal, we report an innovative approach for implementing an optical scattering-based
communication PUF (CPUF) that can reproducibly generate gigabits, as opposed to kilobits, of statistically
random keys. Third, a secure connection is only achieved after realizing some form of synchronization between
the key outputs of two uniquely independent PUF devices, which constitute the encryption systems at each end of
the communication line. We report a novel procedure to link the randomness enclosed by two unique physical
objects without revealing any directly useful information to an adversary, which in combination with a pair of our
CPUF devices allows establishment of a physically secured OTP link.
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Results
Security expectations. Before delving into specifics, we first briefly
outline the operation and security requirements of a successfully
formed CPUF channel (see Fig. 1). To communicate, two users,
Alice and Bob, will first connect their personal CPUF devices over
a known secure connection (e.g., by physically meeting, or by using
QKD) to generate a shared random key. Once separate and mobile,
they may safely exchange encrypted messages over any public
channel until all shared key bits are exhausted. The basis of one-
time pad cryptography stipulates that unconditional security is
guaranteed only if Alice and Bob mix every message bit with an
ideally random key bit without any key re-use. Throughout this
paper, we assume that any key bits statistically indistinguishable
from ideally random bits will sufficiently fulfill this criterion.
Besides offering the OTP’s unconditionally strong encryption, a
‘‘physically secure’’ CPUF link must meet the following require-
ments: first, its security must not depend upon any electronically
stored data. While electronic memory may be used, no key or
message fragment may be determined via a software or hardware
attack targeting its contents. Second, a malicious third party (Eve)
with temporary access to a CPUFmust not be able to efficiently copy
or model its contents. The ‘‘unclonable’’ nature of the CPUF’s
volumetric scatterer, as defined in [26], satisfies this criterion.
Third, if Eve steals a device she must not be able to effectively send
or receive messages. Unlike any other secure communication setup
our CPUF protocol can meet these strict requirements, with a
practical security limit set only by the amount of time it takes to
mathematically characterize the highly complex structure of its
volumetric scatterer.
Device setup. We satisfy the above security expectations by storing
random keys within the optical device outlined in Fig. 2. To generate
a key, we first illuminate a volumetric scattering medium with a
random coherent optical wavefront defined by a spatial light modu-
lator (SLM) (Fig. 2a). An output field emerges with a profile that
depends on both the SLM-defined input wavefront and the
medium’s random distribution and orientation of scattering
particles. A designed aperture mask then shapes the output field
before it propagates to an attached CMOS sensor. The mask is
patterned to ensure the output speckle follows Markov statistics –
an important condition for effective random key generation27. A
combinatorially large space of possible wavelength-scale interac-
tions enables detection of many mutually uncorrelated speckle
field outputs from a set of different SLM phase profile inputs. We
demonstrate how over 10 gigabits of randomness may be optically
extracted from within a 2 mm3 volume. Optically addressing the
PUF scatterer with an array of SLM pixels is the primary experimen-
tal insight enabling extraction of multiple orders of magnitude more
bits than any prior work.
We can mathematically describe this large amount of extractable
physical randomness by representing optical scattering with a ran-
dom complexGaussian transmissionmatrix28T (Fig. 2d). The output
scattered field created by displaying the ith random SLM phase pat-
tern pi may be described by ui 5 T ? pi. After the sensor detects the
Figure 1 | The physical one-time pad (OTP) protocol. (a) The theoretically perfect OTPmixes a binarymessagemwith a randomdigital key k to create an
ideally encrypted ciphertext c (graphics by RH). (b) A major security flaw of many communication protocols, including the OTP, is the direct ability to
copy and share an electronically saved key k. This flawmay be addressed by storing the keywithin a volumetric scatterer’s random structure (PUFA). Keys
can be accessed with specifically shaped optical probes (green light). If the volumetric scatterer’s structure is truly unique and unclonable, then
physical transportation appears to be the only method of sharing keys, which is impractical. (c) The physically secure OTP protocol. The digital XOR of
unique keys from PUF A and B, which itself forms an encrypted OTP ciphertext, may be publicly accessed by each party to form an information-
theoretically secure link between the two uncopyable devices.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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output field’s intensity ri; juij2, a fixed whitening and noise removal
operation W is applied to the speckle pattern to create a statistically
verified random and repeatable key ki (Fig. 2e). The SLM pattern pi
and output key ki are thus connected by,
ki~W : T :pij j2 ð1Þ
The projection of optical field pi into the randommatrix T, uniquely
defined by the volumetric scatterer within each CPUF device,
imparts key ki with its unclonable security.
Physically secure protocol. A set of n random keys k1..n(A) gene-
rated by Alice’s CPUF, along with a corresponding key set
k1..n(B) generated by Bob’s CPUF, enable physically secure OTP
Figure 2 | The construction and operation of a CPUF. (a) Sequentially over time, n random phase patterns pi are displayed on an SLM. (b) Amicroscope
objective (MO) focuses each SLM-defined optical wavefront onto a volumetric scatterer. The scrambled light emerging from thematerial passes through a
designed aperture before being detected by aCMOS sensor. (c) Each detected speckle image r is digitally transformed into a statistically randomkey kwith
a constant digital whitening projectionW. (d) Optical scattering is mathematically represented by a random complex Gaussian matrix T and (e) digital
whitening is described by a sparse binary random matrix W. The combination of one unique T and general W per CPUF device leads to an ideally
random multi-gigabit key space that is very difficult to characterize or clone. (f) The experimental CPUF setup, including all components in (b).
Figure 3 | Ideally secure CPUF communication protocol. (a) During setup, Alice and Bob securely connect their two devices and each generate n CPUF
keys k1..n(A) and k1..n(B) using the same n input SLM patterns p1..n. Each key-mixture ki(A)› ki(B) is saved in a digital electronic dictionary that is
assumed public, along with its corresponding SLMpattern pi. (b) At a later time tc, Alicemay send Bob an unconditionally secure ciphertext c by selecting
a pattern p, re-creating key k(A), and then XORing this key with her message m. The public dictionary can be saved locally on each device without any
sacrifice to security. (c) Bob decrypts the received ciphertext. He uses p to both re-generate key k(B) and to find the public dictionary’s corresponding key-
mixture. The XOR of c with k(B) and the key-mixture reveals m. No secret key is ever digitally stored, obfuscating any copy attack.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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communication with the assistance of a digitally saved public
dictionary (Fig. 3). As described above, Alice and Bob begin by
establishing a secure connection between their two devices. While
connected, they sequentially probe their scatterers with the same set
of n random SLM phase patterns p1..n, respectively detecting key sets
k1..n(A) and k1..n(B) following equation (1) (Fig. 3a). Key sets k1..n(A)
and k1..n(B) reflect each device’s unique transmission matrix TA and
TB but remain synchronized through Alice and Bob’s shared use of
SLM set p1..n. Without leaving any digital trace of an individual key,
Alice and Bob populate a public dictionary with each SLM pattern pi
paired with the digital XOR of the two keys it generates, ki(A) ›
ki(B), for 1# i# n. An eavesdropper will gain no information about
an individual key from this saved XOR ‘‘key-mixture’’, since it takes
the form of a secure OTP ciphertext.
Once mobile at a later time tc, Alice may send Bob an encrypted
messagem by first randomly selecting an unused pattern pi from the
public dictionary to re-create key ki(A) (Fig. 3b). Then, Alicemay use
this key to create and send anXOR-encrypted ciphertext c, where c5
ki(A)›m (here we assume ki(A) andm are the same length – longer
messages are encrypted by concatenating multiple keys). To com-
plete the protocol, Alice must also send Bob the index i of the SLM
pattern pi she displayed, which need not be encrypted.
Bob decrypts Alice’s ciphertext using both his CPUF as well as the
public dictionary (Fig. 3c). He displays pi to optically regenerate key
ki(B), and accesses dictionary entry i to obtain the corresponding
key-mixture [ki(A)› ki(B)]. The decoded message is then obtained
by an XOR of these two sequences with the received ciphertext:
ki Bð Þ+ ki Að Þ+ki Bð Þ½ + ki Að Þ+mð Þ~m ð2Þ
The total number of secure bits N that Alice and Bob may share is
proportional to the product of the number of saved key-mixtures n
and the number of bits within each key jkj. Factors that limit N
include display and sensor resolution, scatterer size, and allowed
setup time (Supplementary Text A).
The security of the above protocol relies upon the CPUF key sets
following what Shannon defines a purely random process1. Possible
deviations from pure randomness fall into three categories: corre-
lated bits within the same key, correlations between keys, and the
introduction of noise between keys generated at time t0 and at time tc.
The sparse projection operator W overcomes such deviations to
create keys that asymptotically approach information-theoretic
security by sacrificing an increasing number of available encryption
bits29. In practice, W’s bit reduction factor is selected such that each
CPUF key set k1..n, viewed as one multi-gigabit random sequence,
passes all tests contained within the Diehard30 and National Institute
of Science and Technology (NIST)31 statistical random number gen-
erator test suites. These two test packages are commonly accepted as
the standards for random sequence certification. While often used to
ensure the suitability of pseudo-random generators for nearly all
cryptographic applications, they also effectively verify physical ran-
domness generation11,12. Performance statistics of the NIST test
applied to an example 10-gigabit CPUF key set are presented in
Table 1. Diehard test results for the same key set are included in
Supplementary Text D. Finally, context-tree weighting (CTW) com-
pression offers a third independent strategy to thoroughly verify the
randomness of PUF-produced keys32. Applying the same CTW algo-
rithm in [32] to an example 1-gigabit CPUF key set generates a
completely uncompressed output (i.e., 0 bits are redundant, indi-
cating the average entropy-per-bit is 1). Supplementary Text D offers
further details regarding the above three statistical tests and the
specific parameters used to extract each multi-gigabit key set.
Experiment. The CPUF devices used in experiment each contain a 2
megapixel transmissive phase SLM imaged onto opal-diffusing glass,
serving as our highly random scatterer. A 2 cm light guide (to
increase the average detected speckle size) connects the scatterer to
a 4.9 megapixel CMOS detector. During public dictionary setup, we
display n5 5,000 different random phase patterns p to generate 174.4
gigabits of raw speckle data from two CPUFs, which is reduced via the
sparse matrix operator W to the N 5 10 gigabits of randomness
statistically verified in Table 1. The approximate theoretical limit of
150 gigabits of randomness per CPUF link may be achieved using a
thicker volumetric scatterer, currently limited to 0.5 mm for optical
stability purposes. Improved-resolution SLM and CMOS arrays may
allow random bit densities to eventually reach 1 terabit/mm3. These
two bit density limits are both derived in Supplementary Text A.
Experimental communication between two CPUFs following our
physically secure OTP protocol is demonstrated tc5 24 hours after
public dictionary setup in Fig. 4. Due to the slight drift of scatterers,
message noise is introduced upon decryption. For example, direct
application of equation (2) to decrypt a standard 40-megabit cipher-
text after a 24-hour delay produces a message with a 0.4 bit-
error-rate (BER). Borrowing concepts from the area of fuzzy
commitment33, we can use error correction codes to reduce this
noise without impacting protocol security. However, the application
of error correction will also reduce the total number of securely
transmittable bits by a fixed fraction, known as the code rate. For
example, a simple error correction strategy based on a code-offset
construction33 with repetition coding (code rate 5 0.025) improves
the average message BER to 0.21. A more computationally demand-
ing BCH coding strategy34 (code rate5 0.035) improves this average
BER to 0.17. We can estimate our CPUF setup’s maximum achiev-
able code rate, independent of a specific error-correction strategy,
using the CTW algorithm mentioned above. Following [32], an
independent mutual information estimate of our tested 40-megabit
encryption and decryption keys sets our code rate upper bound at
0.18, indicating that 18% of our 10-gigabit key sets may lead to
noise-free secure communication. Future work will attempt to
reduce inter-key noise and identify an optimal error correction
strategy to reach the code rate upper bound without leaking any
sensitive information.
Table 1 | Example NIST statistical randomness test performance.
NIST statistical randomness test package performance of a typical
10-gigabit CPUF key set from experiment, split into 10,000 unique
1 megabit sequences following a common procedure11,12. For ‘suc-
cess’ using 10,000 samples of 106 bit sequences and significance
level a50.01, the p-value (uniformity of p-values) should be larger
than 0.0001 and the minimum pass rate is 0.987015. Tests that
produce multiple p-values and proportions are denoted by a (1),
followed by the number of different test values generated in par-
enthesis. The table displays the lowest (i.e., worst-case) generated
p-values and proportions in the set
Statistical Test p-value1 Proportion Pass/Fail
Frequency 0.128 0.9895 Pass
Block Frequency 0.053 0.9925 Pass
Cumulative Sums 0.3881 (2) 0.9897 Pass
Runs 0.760 0.9908 Pass
Longest Run 0.327 0.9899 Pass
Rank 0.028 0.9892 Pass
FFT 0.021 0.9874 Pass
Non-overlapping Template 0.0031 (147) 0.9894 Pass
Overlapping Template 0.002 0.9879 Pass
Universal 0.226 0.9886 Pass
Approximate Entropy 0.156 0.9901 Pass
Random Excursions 0.1631 (8) 0.9873 Pass
Random Excursions Variant 0.0061 (18) 0.9902 Pass
Serial 0.0311 (2) 0.9896 Pass
Linear Complexity 0.887 0.9889 Pass
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Discussion
By linking two physical reservoirs of randomness without relying upon
any secure electronic storage, our CPUF principle fundamentally
transforms how two parties can establish an ideally protected com-
munication link. While the unconditional algorithmic security of the
proposed protocol is well understood, the CPUF device’s physical
security is slightly harder to systematically analyze. To begin, given
an appropriate average scattering particle size and density, the odds of
creating or finding two unique CPUF devices that share an overlap-
ping key sequence are astronomically low (approaching 22jkj for an
ideal scattering volume). Furthermore, attempts to maliciously deter-
mine keys through physically probing a CPUF’s unclonable26 scatter-
ing volume will irreversibly alter its optical response and render its
protocol ineffective24. In addition to utilizing scatterer storage, our
protocol also relies upon a limited number of digital electronic opera-
tions that may be subject to physical scrutiny. Since no permanent
digital memory is used (except to hold the unconditionally secure key-
mixture), the rate of any electronic attack is fundamentally limited by
the optical transfer speed between the scatterer and an accurate CMOS
sensor detection, which we define as the maximum key generation rate
available to Alice and Bob.
Assuming an eavesdropper Eve can undetectably steal a device, the
above limitations set our current CPUF protocol’s functional lifetime
upper bound at approximately 50 hours. This lifetime is fixed by the
approximate time an eavesdropper will require to mathematically
characterize the random structure of an ideally operating CPUF at
the current capture rate of,1.5 seconds per key. Faster capture is not
possible due to induced scatterer heating (see Supplementary Text F).
This functional lifetime scales linearly with the device’s achievable
key space N, which may be easily increased by at least an order of
magnitude with a corresponding improvement in sensor and SLM
resolution. Scatterer heating may likewise be used advantageously to
reset or destroy each CPUF, which makes it impossible for Eve to
recover any previously communicated message.
Through appropriate channel monitoring, it is also possible for
Eve to use a stolen device to directly recover previously communi-
cated messages. To prevent such an attack, Alice and Bob may adopt
a public-key protocol to computationally protect their shared screen
patterns from quick readout. As detailed in Supplementary Text F,
simply replacing each SLM pattern pi in their shared dictionary with
a derived private key PK[pi] offers a fundamental advantage: given
Alice’s device, Eve must either contact Bob to determine each SLM
pattern PK[pi] to use as a probe, or attempt to computationally
recover each pattern PK[pi] by overcoming the discrete logarithm
problem. This simple modification 1) compels Eve to successfully
decrypt each SLM pattern before being able to recover the previously
transmitted message associated with it, and 2) forces Eve to measure
the full scattering matrix T to determine any future communicated
message. While no longer tied to unconditional security, protecting
the CPUF’s multi-megabit probe functions p with traditional cryp-
tographic protocols is a unique feature of our device’s architecture.
We expect this fusion of practical digital security principles with
physical storage (i.e., a form of multi-factor authentication) will be
the subject of much future work, and will allow the CPUF to adapt to
meet the challenges provoked by any inevitable side-channel attacks.
In conclusion, the demonstrated CPUF system applies optical
scattering to access billions of random bits stored within an unclon-
able volumetric structure. Information-theoretically secure com-
munication is achieved using a modified OTP protocol. While
such ideal protection is a good starting point for any new cryp-
tographic mechanism, physical CPUF keys can also extend to pub-
lic-key exchange, which eliminates an initial secure connection
requirement but fails to guarantee OTP-strong security (see
Supplementary Text F). Compared with a large, electronically saved
one-time pad, the CPUF’s key is extremely challenging to copy or
model and can easily scale to provide terabits of repeatable random-
ness within a small volume. Embedding the device’s digital electron-
ics within its volumetric scattering material will further impede any
attempted copy or probe attack. With additional study, we hope the
convenient properties of optical scattering can solve enough of the
OTP’s practical shortcomings to rejuvenate interest in its unbreak-
able security, even in the presence of infinite computing resources.
Methods
Methods summary. One CPUF device uses a spatially filtered and collimated solid-
state 532 nmCW laser (Spectra-Physics, Excelsior Scientific 200 mW) to illuminate a
transmissive SLM (1920 3 1080 pixel, 13 1.6 cm Epson HDTV LCD, BBS
Bildsysteme). The SLM is operated as a phasemodulator (without a second polarizer).
The scatterer-detector CPUF segment is composed of four main components that are
fastened together using an epoxy to minimize any movement with respect to one
another. First, the base of the CPUF is a 2.2 mm, 25923 1944 CMOS pixel array (The
Imaging Source, Micron CMOSMT9P031) with USB readout to a desktop computer.
Second, a glass light guide (1.24 cmQuartz disk, Mcmaster-Carr 1357T62) is fixed to
the surface of the CMOS protective glass. Third, a custom-printed amplitude-
modulating mask (Kodak LVT-exposed on film at 2032 dpi, Bowhaus Printing,
5 mm 3 5 mm) is attached to the glass light guide to serve as the speckle-shaping
aperture. The aperture size is designed to be approximately 1 mmacross, ensuring the
average speckle size extends across 5 sensor pixels, enhancing speckle image stability.
The apodizingmask follows a 2D-separable Cauchy distribution to ensure the speckle
exhibits the required properties of a Markov random process (see Supplementary
Text B). 99% of the mask’s transmitted light is contained within its central 1.2 mm2
area. Fourth, the volumetric scattering material – opal diffusing glass with 0.5 mm
scattering volume thickness (EdmundOptics NT46-645) – is fixed above the aperture
mask.
Figure 4 | Experimental message transmission. Example messages m1 and m2 are sent between two synchronized CPUF devices 24 hours after
dictionary setup (each message image created using Paintbrush). Each message is encrypted to and decrypted from a statistically random ciphertext
c. Here, error correction by repetition coding (code rate 5 0.025) helps reduce noise during decryption.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Key acquisition and processing. A low laser power (,0.2 mW) was used to
illuminate each CPUF, preventing speckle pattern decorrelation from material
heating but requiring a ,1.5 second image exposure time. Image capture and SLM
screen control were driven through a Matlab interface. After capture, the speckle was
transformed into a 1D vector and whitened into a key viamultiplication with amatrix
W (detailed in Supplementary Text C). One large sparse W is stored locally on a
desktop computer for use by two CPUF devices, along with the public dictionary
containing the shared set of n binary random SLM patterns and the XOR key-
mixtures from connection setup. W need not be unique for each CPUF device.
Furthermore, its contents may be known publically without any loss of protocol
security. Each binary SLM pattern was selected uniformly at random from [0, p] to
minimize the probability of key collision. Communication was experimentally
achieved between two similarly constructed CPUF devices by populating a public
dictionary, waiting 24 hours, and then using the same optical setup to execute the
protocol outlined in Fig. 3. Specific encrypt-decrypt parameters for the transmitted
messages in Fig. 4 are outlined in Supplementary Text C, where each message
contains 0.4 megabits after applying error correction, as detailed in Supplementary
Text E.
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